Abstract--We derive a structural index for labor market density based on the Ellison-Glaeser index for industry concentration. The labor market density index serves as a proxy for the number of workers that are potentially available for jobs in a particular area. The index is based on observed home-work location patterns. It is particularly useful for testing theories where the scale of the market matters. We apply this index to a standard wage equation and find that it explains almost half of the cross-region wage variance.
I. Introduction
S EARCH frictions play an important role in the labor market. Job seekers and vacancies do not meet instantaneously; their matching takes effort and time. The efficiency of this matching process depends on the characteristics of the labor market. An obvious factor that matters is the density of the market: the more job seekers and vacancies are available in a particular area, the easier it is for them to find an acceptable match. Several authors have developed empirical models along these lines; see for example Diamond (1982) , Burda and Profit (1996) , Coles and Smith (1998) , Wasmer and Zenou (1999) , Wheeler (2002) , and Glaeser and Maré (2001) . Although there is a large literature that suggests that returns to scale in job search are constant, there is a good reason why the numbers of job seekers and vacancies might matter: A larger labor market allows workers and firms to be more choosy, so it reduces mismatch. This effect is typically ignored in the empirical matching literature, which is based on aggregated time series data.
A big obstacle in research in this area is that labor market density is difficult to measure. One likely candidate for a measure is simply the number of workers and/or jobs per square mile. However, a number of serious drawbacks to this measure immediately come to mind. First, it ignores the role of infrastructure. What we are really interested in is not the set of applicants within a certain distance of the job, but the number of workers that are potentially available for a job in a certain region. The relevant labor market area should then be weighted by the number of highways and public transport facilities. Moreover, when particular regions are more attractive as residential areas, people might be prepared to accept on average a longer commuting time.
These considerations suggest that we should look for an index based on revealed preferences. The index that we propose is based on observed home-work location patterns.
The idea is that we take the location of the job of a worker as given and then analyze where that worker lives. To clarify this idea, assume for the sake of argument that the economy consists of a number of areas with an equal number of inhabitants, say n. Then, if we observe that all workers live in the same area as where they work, a given job can only be occupied by n workers. This is typical for a small-scale labor market. Alternatively, if workers working in a particular location live in 10 different areas, then 10n workers can potentially take jobs in that area and the scale of the labor market is large. More specifically, our index can be viewed as a model-based index of geographic labor market density similar to the dartboard index for industry concentration due to Ellison and Glaeser (1997; henceforth EG) . The index can take any value between 0 and 1. When it is equal to 1, the only workers who work in a particular area are the ones who live there. When it is equal to 0, the labor market is extremely dense and we observe workers from many different areas to be employed in it. In other words, when many workers are available for a particular job in a particular area, we call that area dense.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II derives the index from location decisions of utility-maximizing agents. Section III describes how the index can be constructed from the 5% PUMS of the Census and how it can be linked to the (C)MSA areas of the CPS. Finally, section IV gives an illustration of how the index can be applied in a wage equation and in a model for the cost-of-living index. We find that 45% of the regional variation is captured by our density index.
II. The Index
This section presents the density index, which is a special case of EG's index for industry concentration. Consider the decision problem for the k th worker with a job in area w who has to choose an area h k to live in. We take the distribution of jobs across areas as given and define f w as the fraction of jobs located in area w. Let the utility for area h be given by log kwh ϭ log wh ϩ ε kwh ,
where the ε kwh 's reflect idiosyncratic factors (like the relative preference for clean air, safety, theater availability, and so on), which are assumed to be independent Weibull random variables which are also independent of { wh }, and wh is a random location-specific variable, which is chosen by nature at the start of the process. It reflects the attractiveness of living in a certain area (given that the agent's job is in w) for a typical agent. Conditional on the realization of the random variables w1 , . . . , wH , and given our assumptions on ε kwh , we can write the probability that an agent chooses area h as Prob͕h k ϭ h͉ w1 , . . . , wH ͖ ϭ wh ¥ j wj ϵ p wh , which is a conditional logit model (see McFadden, 1973) . Note that p wh is a random variable because wj are random variables. We assume that the distribution of p wh is such that
where h ʦ 
. In that case, the variation in idiosyncratic characteristics ε kwh is dominated by the variation in the location-specific factors, log wh . When ␥ w ϭ 0, the location decision is totally dominated by the agent's idiosyncratic taste factors. Region-specific factors do not matter. This is the case in a fully integrated, dense labor market. The agent's decision on where to live is independent of the location of the job, and each living area h is chosen with probability x h . The parameter ␥ w can therefore be interpreted as a density index for region w. In other words, ␥ w captures the importance of regional factors relative to idiosyncratic taste factors of the agents. Now we will define an unbiased estimator for ␥ w . Let s wh be the number of workers working in area w and living in area h as a share of total employment in area w. Then: Proposition 1. Consider the case where K workers, distributed across work locations w with share f w , choose their home location according to equations (1), (2), and (3). A consistent estimator for ␥ w is
Proof. We have
The second step uses var(s wh Ϫ x h ͉p wh ) ϭ E[(s wh Ϫ x h ) 2 ͉p wh ] Ϫ E 2 (s wh Ϫ x h ͉p wh ). The third step uses plim K3ϱ var(s wh Ϫ x h ͉p wh ) ϭ 0, E(s wh ͉p wh ) ϭ p wh , and E( x h ) ϭ h . Dropping the conditioning on p wh and substitution of (2) and (3) yields
where we use E( p wh ) ϭ h in the second equality and ¥ h h ϭ 1 in the final equality. Rearranging terms and using E( x h ) ϭ h gives (4). I
To illustrate how this index is related to the scale of the labor market, consider a job in area w. Let there be N residential areas, each populated by a single worker, let n be the number of workers who are willing to work in area w, and let all of them have equal probability of getting the job. Hence, n is a measure for the scale of the labor market. The probability for each of the workers of getting this job is 1/n, and the probability for the rest of the population, N Ϫ n, is equal to zero. In other words, p wh ϭ 1/n with probability n/N, and p wh ϭ 0 with probability 1 Ϫ n/N. Since the variance of a Bernoulli trial with success rate:
According to equation (3), this is equal to: ␥(1/N)(1 Ϫ (1/N)). Solving for ␥ and taking lim N 3 ϱ gives ␥ Ӎ (1/n). Hence, in this simple binomial example where workers either do or do not belong to a market for a particular job and where all workers in a market have an equal probability for that job, ␥ is equal to the reciprocal of the scale of the labor market.
The above analysis takes as a starting point the work area of the worker and then determines the choice of the optimal living area. We could also have proceeded the other way around, by analyzing the choice of the optimal work area conditional on the living area. The actual conditioning on work area in our calculations is based on the notion that a large fraction of city centers consists of offices. Then, conditioning on living area would underestimate the density of the city centers. Most people living in Manhattan are likely to work in Manhattan, incorrectly suggesting that Manhattan is a low-density area. However, most people working in Manhattan live in other regions. Hence, by conditioning on work areas we avoid the problem of the mismeasurement of ␥ w in city centers.
Under the assumptions made, this index is independent of its level of aggregation. 2 Whether one measures location at (for example) the state level or the county level should not affect the calculated value of ␥ w for a state. However, this requires that the values of { wh } be drawn independently of the aggregation scheme of subregions into regions. Obviously, this assumption is violated in reality. In practice, any aggregation merges adjacent subregions into a new region. The values of { wh } for subregions within a region will typically be correlated. The example below makes this clear.
Consider four regions of equal size ( x h ϭ 1/4), each consisting of four agents and four jobs. In the first case all regions form a fully integrated market; s wh ϭ 1/4 for all h, w, and ␥ w ϭ 0. In the second case, s wh ϭ 1/ 2 for all h, w, and ␥ w ϭ 1/3. This is typical for the situation where 1 and 2 as well as 3 and 4 are twin cities. In the third case there are four fully separated markets: s wh ϭ 1 for all h, w, and ␥ w ϭ 1:
(1) ␥ w ϭ 0 When ␥ w ϭ 1/3, combining regions 1 and 2 increases ␥ w . 3 The extreme cases are invariant to the aggregation of regions. For the other cases, aggregation tends to overestimate ␥ w . In the next section, we present estimates of ␥ w for the United States and test whether aggregation affects the results.
III. Data

A. Constructing the Index from Census Data
The U.S. Census data are well suited for the construction of our index, because they contain detailed information on both the area of residence and the work area at low levels of aggregation. We use the 5% public-use micro samples (PUMS) of the 1990 Census. The most disaggregate geographic unit in the Census is the public-use micro data area (PUMA). A typical PUMA is populated by at least 100,000 persons and is identified by a five-digit number, which is unique within states. In dense areas, PUMAs are a subset of a single county, whereas in rural states, PUMAs typically consist of several different counties. To construct our density index we also need information on the area where the worker works (PUMAW). This is however defined at the two-digit level (unique by state), which will be the level of our analysis. With the method of the previous section we were able to construct a ␥ w for each of the 1138 two-digit PUMAs.
In calculating ␥ w , we only included the full-time employed workers and excluded Alaska and Hawaii. Since in general, each area is very small compared to the whole country, the denominator of (4) is close to 1 (namely, using Census data, we found for the U.S. ¥ w x h 2 ϭ 0.0024), and ␥ w is therefore almost entirely determined by ⌺ h (s wh Ϫ x h ) 2 . To get an idea of the range of possible values ␥ w can attain, we found ␥ w to be equal to 0.07 in northern New Jersey, whereas for some areas in Arizona, Maine, Missouri, Montana, Kansas, and Wyoming we found values of ␥ w as high as 0.95. The distribution of PUMA's population shares is plotted in figure 1. Both the mean and the standard deviation of these population shares are 0.001. It suggests that we do not have to worry about aggregation bias. This is confirmed by a simple OLS regression of log ␥ w on the log population shares of the area, which shows that there exists an insignificant positive relation between ␥ w and area size (the elasticity is 0.02, t ϭ 0.56).
B. Using Additional Information from the CPS
For many economic applications, the CPS contains crucial individual information which is not present in the Census. That is why we aggregated up our index to the (C)MSA ϫ state level. This is not a trivial operation, because there is no one-to-one match between the PUMAs of the Census and the (C)MSA (central metropolitan area) and state classification of the CPS. We therefore use the following strategy. First, we match the PUMAWs to (C)MSAs, using the method of Jaeger et al. (1998) . We aggregate by taking weighted (by population share) averages of the relevant ␥ w 's. In most states there are however areas which do not belong to a (C)MSA. Those are typically rural areas. For those areas we also calculated weighted average ␥ w 's per state. 4 Finally, there are some small (C)MSAs that consist of only one PUMA. When those areas are isolated (for example, Tucson, Phoenix) or close to the Mexican border (El Paso), this overestimates ␥ w for the reasons we discussed in section II. We therefore treat (C)MSAs consisting of only one PUMA like the within-state areas that do not belong to a (C)MSA. This leaves us with in total 164 ␥ w 's.
To illustrate the aggregation procedure, consider the following example for Indianapolis, IN. The Indianapolis CMSA consists of four PUMAs, each with a unique ␥ Census . In the CPS, Indianapolis is treated as a single geographical unit. We take weighted (by x w ) averages of ␥ Census to get a unique ␥ CPS for Indianapolis.
Figure 2 plots density distributions for both the 1138 Census PUMAs and the 164 CPS areas. The mean for ␥ Census is 0.597, and the standard deviation is 0.235; for ␥ CPS those values are respectively 0.574 and 0.185. From this, we conclude that we do not lose much variation in our index by aggregating up to the (C)MSA ϫ state level, suggesting that the CPS regions are quite homogeneous with respect to their ␥. The overall shapes of the distributions are quite similar, they are bimodal with one hump at ␥ ϭ 0.80; the other hump is at ␥ ϭ 0.25 for the Census and at ␥ ϭ 0.40 for the CPS. 5 We expect ␥ w to be related to population density (measured in persons per square mile). Figure 3 is illustrative in this respect. Figure 3 shows a map of all the counties in the United States, where the darker areas are more densely populated. In this figure we have inserted some values of ␥ w , based on the Census PUMAs. We clearly see that densely populated areas have smaller ␥ w 's. The correlation between ␥ CPS and people per square mile is Ϫ0.43.
IV. Application: Estimation of a Wage Equation
In this section we look at the effect of our labor market density index on wages. This application merely serves as an illustration. We do not have a narrow structural interpretation of our estimation results. In the literature, several reasons for the existence of cross-regional wage differentiation have been put forward: regional differences in the efficiency of the matching process, as in Teulings and Gautier (2002) and Wheeler (2002) ; knowledge spillovers, 4 For the definitions of (C)M(S)As we refer to Appendix A. Our density measures and relevant weights per PUMAW of the 1990 census and per (C)MSA/MA of the CPS, as well as SAS formats for (C)MSAs and states, can be found at http://www.tinbergen.nl/ ϳ gautier/lmdensity.html.
5 See Appendix B for a full listing of ␥. as in Lucas (1988) and Glaeser and Maré (2001) ; or compensating differentials, as in Roback (1982) . For our purposes it is enough that wages are correlated with labor market density. We are interested in the fraction of the cross-regional variance in wages that can be attributed to our labor market density index. If density matters, it should pick up a substantial part of the cross-regional variation in wages. We use both the March 1991 supplements of the CPS and the 1% PUMS of the 1990 Census for our wage equation. Most of our attention goes to the CPS results, because that allows for a more accurate calculation of earnings and hours worked. In the PUMS, working time was measured as an interval variable, which makes the hourly wage rate less accurate. 6 Directly estimating the effect of ␥ on log wages with OLS gives an unbiased estimate of , but it produces downwardly biased standard errors in the presence of within-region correlation of the disturbances; see Moulton (1990) . Therefore, the following equations are estimated by OLS:
where log w ij is the log (gross) hourly wage of worker i from region j, and X 1 contains all the standard variables of the wage equation; 7 R j is a set of region dummies. Equation (5) was estimated once on all regions and once on the 95 (C)MSAs for which we have additional information on people per square mile and cost of living. We experimented in equation (6) with various extra controls. The results are presented in table 1. We can conclude from estimation 1 that our density index explains 45% of the cross-regional wage variation that is not If, for the reasons we mentioned above, dense areas are attractive and if the stock of real estate is to some extent fixed, then the real estate owners receive rents. We therefore expect our index to be correlated with the cost of living. To see to what extent this is the case, we add the regional cost-of-living index of Dumond, Hirsch, and MacPherson (1999) . This index is based on the American Chamber of Commerce Researchers Association (ACCRA) cost-ofliving index for the period 1985:4 through 1995:2. In estimations 7, 8, and 9 we see that this measure is also positively related to both our density index and people per square mile.
In estimation 10, we estimate the effect of our density index at the PUMA level of aggregation with data from the 1% PUMS of the Census; see Ruggles and Sobek (1997) . 8 The estimate of in the equivalent of estimation 6 is Ϫ0.066 (16.76). Again, we conclude that workers in denser areas earn higher wages. 9
V. Discussion
We have shown that we can give a meaningful structural labor market interpretation of the Ellison and Glaeser (1997) index of concentration. The large and significant effect that our density index has on wages suggests that it captures important effects. Our index is particularly useful for testing theories that predict that the scale of the labor market matters. From a theoretical point of view, our index is more attractive than the obvious alternative: people per square mile. This index is available for (C)MSA's only. For those regions for which it is available, our index and people per square mile are correlated. However, both are statistically significant in a wage equation. In Teulings and Gautier (2002) , we successfully apply our density index to analyze the effect of the efficiency of the search process on the distribution of workers and jobs across regions. APPENDIX B 
